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Abstract: New research on historical national accounting has provided a more 
comprehensive picture of European economic performance from the medieval period 
through industrialization and the transition to modern economic growth. These data confirm 
anecdotal arguments that pre-industrial economies were not stagnant but rather experienced 
periods of growth followed by reversals which erased gains in living standards. They also 
provide a framework for comparing the absolute level of economic development in different 
times and places, using a common unit of account. These data are used here to re-assess the 
economic performance of African economies during the twentieth century. While African 
economies have been growing rapidly in recent decades, levels of per capita income remain 
low and this growth has not always been accompanied by the institutional and structural 
change witnessed in Europe during the transition to modern economic growth. As a result, 
growth reversals continue to pose a serious threat to African prosperity, and measures of 
structural change and institutional quality should be given more weight in assessing the 
extent to which individual countries have moved closer to achieving sustained economic 
growth. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Efforts to measure the performance of pre-industrial economies have often been hindered 
by the limited availability of quantitative data. This lack of information has often led to 
assumptions that, prior to the industrial revolution, economic growth was limited. Such 
assumptions have influenced the study of regions as diverse as Europe, Asia and Africa. 
In his landmark study of the economies of West Africa, Hopkins (1973: 9) noted that 
studies of African economic history often assumed that the pre-colonial economy was ‘a 
subsistence economy which was uniform, unchanging, and therefore uninteresting’. 
Similarly, economic historians of the medieval period have often stressed the limited 
extent of economic growth (Hatcher and Bailey 2001: 122).  Epstein (2000: 1) noted that 
in much of the historiography of pre-modern Europe, the idea of ‘pre-modern economic 
growth was a contradiction in terms’.  
 
Recent work in historical national accounting has allowed economic performance 
before the industrial revolution to be measured on an annual basis (Broadberry et al., 
2011; van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2012; Malanima, 2011; Álvarez-Nogel and Prados 
de la Escosura, 2013). This work has shifted understandings of pre-industrial European 
economies in two fundamental ways. First, it has shown that levels of per capita income 
in medieval Europe were already significantly above subsistence. Second, it has 
illustrated that for centuries prior to the transition to sustained economic growth during 
the Industrial Revolution, European economies experienced periods of positive per capita 
income growth, but followed by periods of negative per capita income growth, or 
“growth reversals”. Sometimes these periods of positive growth lasted several decades 
3  
before the gains were eroded by reversals. These new data confirm anecdotal accounts 
which challenge assumptions of stagnation in pre-industrial European economies, arguing 
that growth was possible but often not sustained owing to the impact of political, 
demographic or climatic shocks (Epstein, 2000: 2; Jones, 1993).  
 
In addition to revising standard assumptions about economic performance in pre-
industrial Europe, this research can also provide insights into more recent economic 
trends by placing ‘boom’ periods in the twentieth century in a longer historical context. A 
growing literature has attempted to distinguish growth accelerations likely to be followed 
by reversals from those which may mark a transition to sustained growth (Johnson, Ostry 
and Subramanian 2010; Berg, Ostry aand Zettelmeyer, 2008; Jones and Olken, 2005; 
Rodrik, 1999). A key aim of this literature has been to assess whether the rapid growth of 
African economies since the mid-1990s means that Africa has turned the corner to follow 
in Asia’s footsteps. Viewing Africa’s economic performance since the early twenty-first 
century from a longer historical perspective serves as a reminder that a period of growth 
lasting several decades does not necessarily signal the transition to sustained growth.  
 
Historical national accounting provides a framework for comparing the absolute 
level of development in different times and places, using 1990 international dollars as a 
common unit of account (Maddison, 1995; 2001; 2010). Similar comparisons have also 
been used to identify patterns of economic development and assess the growth prospects 
of developing economies (Chenery and Syrquin, 1975; Crafts, 1984). The extension of 
national accounting data into earlier historical periods allows this method to be applied to 
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pre-industrial economies. This is important because it avoids trying to assess the 
prospects of countries that remain poor today from the experience of currently developed 
countries only after they became rich. According to Johnson, Ostry and Subramanian 
(2010:125), comparisons with wealthy countries after industrialization are problematic 
because ‘developing countries today may be different from European and other countries 
that either had good institutions already by 1850 or were well on their way to developing 
such institutions’. Many African economies in the twenty-first century have levels of 
GDP per capita (measured in 1990 international dollars) which are similar to those of 
medieval European economies. Even while achieving levels of per capita income well 
above bare bones subsistence, medieval economies failed to make the transition to 
sustained economic growth for several centuries. Only a small number of African 
economies have per capita incomes above $2,000 in 1990 international prices, which is 
the level of Britain at the start of modern economic growth in the early nineteenth century.  
 
Existing explanations for the European transition to modern economic growth 
suggest that two related ingredients are necessary: economic diversification and 
institutional change. In Europe, an important part of the transition to modern economic 
growth was the growth of industrial and service sectors (van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 
2012; Broadberry et al., 2011). Structural change was facilitated by stable institutions 
which provided producers with incentives to specialize. In contrast, most African 
economies are dominated by primary commodities, including both minerals and 
agricultural exports which are subject to alternating growth booms and growth reversals.  
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The precise nature of the institutional reforms necessary to support structural 
change remains the subject of debate. One line of argument suggests that the key 
institutional change is the imposition of constraints on the executive, so that rulers cannot 
intervene arbitrarily in business matters (North and Weingast, 1989; Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson, 2005). Others have argued that what really mattered was the expansion of 
state capacity (Epstein, 2000; O’Brien, 2011). According to this theory, market 
integration was hindered by the “freedoms” granted by relatively weak rulers to interests 
such as towns and guilds. What was needed for sustained growth was centralization of 
state power. In his study of the development of European fiscal systems since the early 
modern period, Dincecco (2011) argues that the two sides are complementary, and that 
both the restriction of executive authority and the expansion of state capacity are 
necessary components in the creation of effective fiscal states.  
 
This paper uses Europe’s development experience to assess the growth prospects 
of African economies. Section 2 provides a quantitative framework for comparing 
twentieth-century Africa with pre-modern Europe, based on levels of GDP per capita in 
1990 international dollars. Section 3 then examines the patterns of growth in pre-
industrial economies, in both Europe and Africa, highlighting the tendency for growth 
booms to be followed by growth reversals and drawing out the implications of Europe’s 
experience for the sustainability of growth booms in Africa. Section 4 then examines the 
transition of a number of European economies to sustained modern economic growth 
during the nineteenth century, highlighting the process of economic diversification and 
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institutional change at different levels of income, and using the results to shed further 
light on the sustainability of growth booms in African economies. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. MEASURING LEVELS OF INCOME IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES 
Historical national accounting produces estimates of the level of per capita income in pre-
industrial economies in units which allow comparisons across space and time. In this 
section, recent estimates will be brought together to compare levels of income in Europe 
and sub-Saharan Africa. Levels of per capita income in European countries in the pre-
industrial period will be shown to have been already substantially above subsistence, and 
comparable to levels of per capita income in African countries in the post-war period. 
This will provide the foundation for the following sections on patterns of growth and 
reversal over time and the transition to sustained economic growth.  
 
2.1 Sources and methods 
For both Europe and Africa, GDP per capita figures are reported in 1990 international 
dollars, which is convenient for making comparisons across space and time. For each 
country, GDP is measured in local currency, but converted to constant price terms by 
correcting for price changes over time with a 1990 base year. The conversion to a 
common currency involves comparison of local prices in 1990 with dollar prices in the 
same year, and a weighting scheme based on international rather than just US patterns of 
consumption. In 1990, the World Bank poverty level for an individual was a dollar a day, 
or $365 a year, so that the minimum or “bare bones subsistence” level of GDP per capita 
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in 1990 international dollars is usually taken as $400, since even the poorest economies 
have a small elite with much higher levels of income.  
 
 Annual data on GDP per capita are now available for Spain, Italy, Britain and 
Holland reaching back to around 1300, presented in Figures 1 and 2. These estimates are 
based on hard data recovered from records produced at the time, processed within a 
modern national accounting framework. They represent a considerable advance on the 
“guesstimates” provided by Maddison (2001; 2003; 2010) for the pre-1820 period, where 
many observations were set at $400 in 1990 international prices based on the assumption 
that pre-industrial economies stagnated at subsistence level, rather than with reference to 
data from that period. The quality of the underlying data varies between countries. For 
some European countries, including Britain and the Netherlands, abundant quantitative 
data have survived, so that historical national accounts can be rebuilt in great detail 
(Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen, 2011; 2014; van Zanden and 
van Leeuwen, 2012). For other countries, including Italy and Spain, Malanima (2011), 
Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013) have developed a short-cut method for 
reconstructing GDP from more limited information. For agriculture, the demand for food  
is derived from estimates of population, real wages and the relative price of food, with 
adjustments for foreign trade. For non-agriculture, it uses data on the urbanization rate, 
again with adjustments for specific factors such as agro-towns and rural proto-industry.  
 
 For African countries, the most widely used source of national accounting data is 
the series provided by the World Bank, starting in 1960 (Jerven, 2013: 16-17). This late 
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start date has often shaped perceptions of African economic performance. In an 
influential 1989 report, the Bank stated that ‘economic growth has a relatively brief 
history in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (World Bank, 1989: 11). However, renewed interest in 
African economic performance before that date (see Hopkins, 2009) has prompted efforts 
to estimate GDP per capita for earlier periods. Chronologically, the longest series is for 
the Cape Colony of South Africa, from 1701-1910 (Fourie and van Zanden, 2013). For 
other African countries, speculative series begin only in the late nineteenth century. 
Maddison estimates a figure of $439 for Ghana in 1870, barely above subsistence, 
reflecting the same assumptions as the European ‘guesstimates’ discussed above. More 
recently, Prados de la Escosura (2012) has produced estimates based on projecting an 
econometric relationship between the income terms of trade and GDP per capita in the 
post-1950 period back into the pre-1950 period, where data on the income terms of trade 
are available. For purposes of comparability, his paper will rely primarily on Maddison’s 
figures from 1950 onwards, which capture a larger number of countries than the longer 
series discussed above. Though doubts have been cast about the quality of African 
national accounts (prominently if not for the first time in Jerven, 2013), the general 
pattern of growth is similar across the competing series. Figure 4 charts real GDP per 
capita in 1990 international dollars for Africa as a whole for the period 1950-2010. 
 
2.2 Levels of per capita income in Europe and Africa  
In this section, we identify critical levels of GDP per capita during Europe’s development 
process and map contemporary African economies into these levels. The estimates in 
Table 1 suggest that western Europe was already well above bare bones subsistence 
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($400) by the late Middle Ages, with average per capita GDP in England and Holland 
around $750 on the eve of the Black Death in 1348, and substantially higher than this in 
Italy and Spain. The first income category will therefore be less than $750. This can be 
seen as applying to whole of Europe during the early medieval period. The second 
income category is $750 to $1,500. This level of income encapsulates the range of 
European income levels after the ‘commercial revolution’ of the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. England and Holland were at the lower end of this spectrum in the mid-
fourteenth century, while Italy was at the upper end. Holland and England reached the 
upper end of this range only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, respectively.  The 
third category is $1,500 to $2,000. The upper end of this range corresponds to Britain in 
1800, by which time the Industrial Revolution and the transition to modern economic 
growth were in full swing, and urbanization was proceeding rapidly. Holland had reached 
this level by 1570, the start of its Golden Age. The fourth income category is over $2,000, 
a level reached in Holland after 1600 and Britain after 1800. It was from this level of 
income that both countries made the transition to modern economic growth.  
 
 Table 2 maps the mainland countries of sub-Saharan Africa into the above four 
income categories. The majority of sub-Saharan countries in 2008 have per capita 
incomes in the first two categories. Only a handful of countries – several of which, like 
Equatorial Guinea, are oil exporters with comparatively small populations – have per 
capita incomes higher than Britain at the start of the nineteenth century. This finding has 
implications for debates about whether African countries have made the transition to 
modern economic growth, as European economies that had similar income levels in the 
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fourteenth century continued to stagnate for another five hundred years or more. 
Subsequent sections will refer to four case study countries (Sierra Leone, Kenya, Nigeria 
and South Africa), selected because they each fit into one of the four income categories. 
Sierra Leone fits into the first category, with per capita income of less than $750 1990 
international dollars both in 1950 and in 2008. Kenya’s per capita income in 2008, at 
$1,098, puts it comfortably into the second category ($750-$1,500). The number of 
countries in the third and fourth categories shrinks considerably. Nigeria fits into the third 
category, while South Africa’s per capita income in 2008 ($5,048) is comparable to that 
of Britain in the early twentieth century.  
 
3. PATTERNS OF GROWTH IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES 
Studies of pre-industrial economies need to reconcile strong evidence of economic 
growth and incomes above subsistence with limited improvement in living standards over 
time. These two facts can be explained by a pattern of growth which includes periods of 
positive growth, followed by reversals that erased gains in living standards. Jones (1993: 
1) labeled this phenomenon ‘growth recurring’, writing that ‘the underlying tendency for 
growth has been hidden by the apparent economic stagnation of most of history, but it 
was nevertheless there’. Periods of growth were reversed owing to shocks of various 
types, including environmental change and institutional failures. This section uses 
available data for both Europe and Africa to demonstrate the prevalence of alternating 
growth booms and growth reversals. Data from four European countries from 1270-1870 
are presented first, and show that this pattern can persist across centuries. This provides a 
context for the interpretation of the shorter series of data for African countries. 
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3.1 Growth and reversals in Europe, 1270-1870 
The new estimates of national income per head in four European countries between the 
thirteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century, presented in Figures 1 and 2, suggest a 
pattern of periods of economic growth followed by growth reversals. This underlines the 
point that low standards of living in pre-industrial economies are not due to persistent 
failure, but rather to inconsistency, so that the fruits of short run success are quickly lost. 
A key driver of both positive and negative growth was shifting fortunes of export 
commodities such as wool and long-distance trade in luxury items such as silk and spices 
(Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, 2013; Power, 1941; Findlay and O’Rourke, 
2007). All four economies also suffered from shorter cycles of growth and reversal, 
driven by changes in agricultural output linked to climatic changes from year to year.  
 
 The general pattern of long run stagnation with alternating periods of growth and 
growth reversals is well illustrated by the cases of Italy and Spain in Figure 1. Italy had 
an unusually high level of per capita income in the medieval period, reaching $1,482 as 
early as 1300, as compared with $755 in England and $957 in Spain. Italy’s relative 
affluence during this period is attributed to the role of city states such as Florence, Venice 
and Genoa in facilitating long distance trade between Europe and Asia. (Luzzatto, 1961; 
Lane, 1966; Kindleberger, 1996; Maddison, 2001). Domination of Mediterranean trade 
routes created the formula for impressive growth which made Italy arguably Europe’s 
‘most advanced’ economy during the medieval period (Russell, 1972: 39). However, 
changing external conditions undermined the basis for this growth. The first was 
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restrictions on trade with Syria and Egypt imposed by the Ottoman Empire, and second, 
competition from Portuguese shipments between Europe and Asia on new trade routes 
around Africa (van der Wee, 1990). Through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries GDP 
per capita in Italy declined to a low of $1,244 in 1600.  
 
 A similar pattern can be observed for pre-industrial Spain. Álvarez-Nogal and 
Prados de la Escosura (2013) argue that Spain’s economic history before the nineteenth 
century can be divided into two epochs, each of which was characterized by periods of 
both positive and negative growth, driven largely by fluctuations in the wool trade. In the 
first epoch, from the 1270s to the 1590s, sustained progress was interrupted by the Black 
Death and then resumed from the 1390s. The plague had a negative effect on Spanish 
incomes, in contrast to much of the rest of Europe, where it reduced demographic 
pressure. By destroying commercial networks and increasing isolation amongst an 
already scarce population, the Black Death reduced Spain’s ability to maintain per capita 
income, which had declined to $885 by 1400. As a result of renewed commercial 
expansion on the basis of wool exports from the 1390s and Spain’s key role in Europe’s 
encounter with the Americas from the 1490s, per capita GDP was again close to its pre-
Black Death level by the end of the sixteenth century (MacKay, 1977). The second epoch, 
running from the 1600s to the 1800s, began with a sustained fall in per capita income 
between the late sixteenth and mid-seventeenth century, as wool exports declined and the 
Spanish economy became more inward-oriented (Flynn, 1982; Drelichman, 2005). 
Economic recovery only took place in the eighteenth century, and when per capita 
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incomes again reached the level of the 1590s at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
Spain no longer dominated economic links between Europe and the New World.  
 
 Figure 2 presents data on Britain and Holland over the same period. Like Italy and 
Spain, both countries experienced periods of growth and reversal which limited long-run 
gains in per capita income during the medieval period. However, unlike Italy and Spain, 
they were able to make the transition to modern economic growth before the late 
nineteenth century (Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen, 2014). This 
resulted in a reversal of fortunes between the North Sea Area and Mediterranean Europe, 
known as the “Little Divergence”. Whereas Italy and Spain had higher levels of per 
capita income than Britain and Holland in the early fourteenth century, Britain and 
Holland were clearly ahead of Italy and Spain by the nineteenth century. The first growth 
spurt in Britain and Holland occurred following the Black Death and subsequent 
outbreaks of plague from the mid-fourteenth century (Bridbury, 1962; Herlihy, 1997). As 
in many other countries, the short-run effects of the Black Death on GDP were 
catastrophic. Real GDP in England declined by over thirty per cent in the three years after 
1348, and it was not until the sixteenth century that it recovered to 1348 levels 
(Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen, 2011). It was only the heavy 
population losses during the epidemic that increased the level of GDP per capita. In 
contrast to Italy, however, per capita incomes remained at this higher level rather than 
returning to their pre-1348 level.  
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 A second wave of growth followed, led by Holland during its Golden Age, 1570-
1650, and then by Britain from the mid-seventeenth century. In both cases, this growth 
was punctuated by periods of reversal during Europe’s so-called ‘crisis of the seventeenth 
century’, variously attributed to population pressure, war, inflation, and institutional 
failures (de Vries, 1994: 21-5). Even on the cusp of the transition to modern economic 
growth, both economies suffered reversals which lasted several decades. This second 
wave of growth, which cemented the ‘Little Divergence”, has been linked to control of 
long-distance trade, following the opening up of new trade routes to Asia around the 
southern tip of Africa, and to the New World following Europe’s encounter with the 
Americas (van der Wee, 1990; Kindleberger, 1996; Maddison, 2001). Spain and Portugal, 
which had Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts and were the pioneers of these new trades, 
achieved early gains but did not make the transition to sustained economic growth. The 
key to breaking out of the cycle of growth booms and reversals was a set of structural and 
institutional changes which will be considered in detail in section 4.  
 
3.2 Economic growth in Africa, 1700-2010 
Estimates of GDP per capita for African countries dating back to the eighteenth century 
show a pattern of growth similar to that of medieval and early modern Europe. Figure 3, 
which gives GDP per capita for the Cape Colony and South Africa, shows firstly that per 
capita incomes in the Cape Colony were already high in the early eighteenth century 
(Fourie and van Zanden, 2013). Boshoff and Fourie (2010) link much of this growth to 
the impact of international trade. Much like in medieval Europe, these estimates revise 
earlier perceptions of the Cape Colony as largely stagnant, at close to subsistence level, 
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until the discovery of minerals in the nineteenth century. However, the Cape economy 
was subject to reversals, particularly in the 1710s, the 1780s, and through the early 
nineteenth century. These crises were linked to external factors interfering with 
international trade, such as warfare in the 1710s and 1780s, and also to internal factors 
such as a smallpox epidemic in the 1710s (Fourie and van Zanden, 2013).  
 
 For other African countries, we do not have any estimates covering such a long 
period. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is likely that international trade stimulated 
periods of growth in particular regions dating far into the past. The rise of the trans-
Saharan trade in gold, slaves and ivory from the early medieval period led to the 
emergence of large urban centres and elaborate commercial institutions in West Africa 
and along the edge of the desert (Lydon 2009). Much like in Venice and Genoa, cities 
like Timbuktu, centre of the once-mighty Kingdom of Mali, prospered through the 
facilitation of international trade. Similarly, the expansion of trade between Europe and 
West Africa (including the Atlantic slave trade) led to increasing commercialization, 
albeit with long-term costs associated with demographic losses (Jerven, 2010). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests periods of reversal following such booms.  
 
 From the late nineteenth century, however, estimates are available which show 
that through the twentieth century, African countries experienced a series of booms and 
busts, largely linked to international trade. Prados de la Escosura (2012) gives estimates 
for eight African countries (Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, the Gambia, Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Mauritius) from c. 1880-1960. With the exception of Mauritius and the 
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Gambia, his estimates show strong growth through the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, a period when the production of cash crops for export was expanding rapidly 
under favourable terms of trade (Havinden and Meredith, 1996; Hopkins, 1973). Many 
countries then experienced a sharp reversal during the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
when export prices declined. In Tanzania, this reversal was sufficiently severe that the 
level of per capita income achieved in 1925 was not reached again until after World War 
II.  In the Gambia and Mauritius, the decline started much earlier, after early cash crop 
booms (in groundnuts and sugar, respectively) had begun to fade.  
 
 The longer-term picture of African growth patterns that emerges from these 
estimates provides a new perspective on the more familiar national accounting data for 
post-war Africa. Averaged across sub-Saharan Africa, data from both the Maddison 
dataset and the World Bank show a period of growth in the 1950s and 1960s which ended 
with the oil crises of the 1970s. This was followed by two decades of stagnation or 
decline until the mid-1990s. The severity of the reversal following the 1970s crisis meant 
that by the 1990s, levels of per capita income in many African countries were at or even 
below the levels of the 1960s. Data from the Maddison dataset are shown in Figure 4.  
Average figures across the sub-Saharan region mask considerable diversity between 
countries in terms of both the level of per capita income and the pattern of economic 
growth. Figures 5 and 6 plot GDP per capita for the four African countries identified in 
section 2 from 1950 to 2008. They illustrate substantial differences not only in 2008 but 
also in their earlier experiences. Though the pattern of periods of growth followed by 
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reversals applies to all of them, different resource endowments and political histories 
have resulted in different growth paths.  
 
The richest of the four countries, in both 1950 and 2008, was South Africa, which 
as shown in Figure 5 experienced a long period of fairly consistent economic growth 
following the mineral discoveries of the nineteenth century (Feinstein, 2005). Its per 
capita GDP in 1950 was $2,591, substantially higher than the other three countries. It did, 
however, suffer a significant reversal linked to both increasing political instability in the 
last years of the apartheid government, a falling gold price, and increasing trade sanctions 
(Fedderke and Simkins, 2012). The scale of the reversal was such that the peak of GDP 
per capita achieved in the late 1970s ($4,480) was only regained in 2006.  
 
The second-richest of the four countries in 2008 was Nigeria, with a per capita 
income of around $1,600 in 2008. This represented a considerable increase since 1950, 
when Nigeria was a largely agricultural economy with per capita income of a little less 
than $800. Nigeria’s post-war growth boom was interrupted early by a short but sharp 
reversal in the late 1960s linked to the Biafran War (1967-70), during which GDP per 
capita fell below its 1950 level (Iyoha and Orioaki, 2008). The oil booms of the 1970s led 
once again to positive growth but these gains were vulnerable to external changes and 
internal mismanagement, and GDP per capita declined through the 1980s and remained 
stagnant through the 1990s. In 2000, a new period of growth began, underpinned by oil 
production and expansions in agriculture and services (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2012).  
18  
 
The third country, Kenya, has experienced less volatile economic performance, 
but still shares many features with the other cases. As in Nigeria, conflict interrupted the 
post-war boom – in this case the Emergency of the 1950s. Growth resumed through the 
late 1950s but stagnated in the early 1960s, before resuming later in the decade. The 
coffee boom of the 1970s mitigated the effects of the oil crisis in the short run, but 
economic performance was poor during much of the 1980s (Mwega and Nudung’u, 
2008). A brief recovery during the late 1980s was ended by outbreaks of ethnic violence 
following elections in 1992 and 1997 (Elischer, 2010). This was compounded by 
droughts and high oil prices due to the Gulf War (Mwega and Ndung’u, 2008).  
 
The poorest of the four countries in 2008, by far, was Sierra Leone, which had a 
per capita income of less than $750, not dramatically different from its per capita income 
in 1950. Economic growth kept pace with the other three countries until the early 1970s. 
However, increasing political tension under a repressive one-party system led to 
stagnation from the early 1970s and then, finally, a major reversal coinciding with the 
outbreak civil war in 1991 (Reno, 1998). By the end of the conflict, Sierra Leone’s per 
capita income was at subsistence level. Although there has been recovery following the 
official end of the war in 2002, overall growth since 1950 has been negligible.  
 
 
 As these cases illustrate, economic and political circumstances shaped the precise 
pattern of growth in both medieval Europe and twentieth-century Africa. Nevertheless, a 
number of general conclusions can be drawn. First, all of the countries profiled here 
19  
experienced long periods of stagnation owing to the boom-and-bust cycle of pre-
industrial economic growth. In both Europe and Africa, estimates of per capita income 
suggest that assumptions the pre-industrial economies were stuck at subsistence level are 
misleading. However, long-term improvements in per capita income are possible only if 
growth booms are accompanied by structural and institutional change that make the 
economy more robust to negative shocks. The remainder of this section focuses on 
growth reversals, while section 4 will explore the possibilities of breaking out of the 
pattern of long run stagnation and making the transition to sustained economic growth. 
 
3.3 Comparing growth reversals in Europe and Africa 
To what extent are the growth booms and reversals experienced by African countries 
comparable to those occurring in medieval Europe? A key question is to what extent the 
accelerations and reversals identified above were similar across time and space. Because 
the European GDP per capita data in Figures 1 and 2 cover a much longer period than the 
African data in Figures 5 and 6, the former may at first sight appear less volatile than the 
latter. However, the scale of the reversals is actually quite similar, measured by the 
standard deviation of annual growth rates. The annual growth rate in the four African 
countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Sierra Leone) was highly variable. The 
maximum annual growth rate recorded across the four countries was 27.0 per cent in 
Nigeria in 1970 during the recovery from the Biafran War, which followed the sharpest 
negative growth rate of -17.96 per cent in 1967. The standard deviation was 6 to 7 
percentage points in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and 3 to 4 percentage points in the less 
volatile Kenya and South Africa. Turning to the European data, the standard deviation 
20  
was 6 to 8 percentage points for Britain and Holland, which was similar to the 6 to 7 
percentage points for Nigeria and Sierra Leone, while the lower rate of 5 percentage 
points for Italy was closer to the experience of Kenya and South Africa.1  
 
 The study of this pattern of boom and bust has recently gained greater prominence 
in the literature on economic growth. Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers (1993) 
point out that the volatility of economic growth in most countries contrasts with the 
stability of characteristics generally thought to play an important role in determining 
growth performance. Pritchett (2000) notes that variation in growth rates is particularly 
marked in developing countries. In response to these observations, a growing literature 
has attempted to understand the factors most likely to influence the beginning (or end) of 
growth episodes. The economic histories of both Africa and Europe suggest that many 
factors can initiate growth accelerations. In their study of growth accelerations across 110 
countries in the post-war period, Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005: 328) find that 
‘growth accelerations are a fairly frequent occurrence’, suggesting that ‘achieving rapid 
growth over the medium term is not something that is tremendously difficult’. The longer 
series of data presented here confirms that this is true not only of recent history, but also 
has been the case for many centuries. This long-run picture also shows that sustaining 
such growth accelerations is tremendously difficult, such that only a few countries have 
managed it. The next section will draw on the economic histories of both Europe and 
Africa to link structural change and institutional reform to the ending of growth reversals.  
                                                         
1 The much lower standard deviation of 0.7 percentage points for Spain suggests that the latter data series 
may not be fully capturing the extent of annual fluctuations.  
21  
4. INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH 
In the examples given above, growth reversals were often linked to changing conditions 
for external trade, whether due to war or declining demand for raw materials. A key 
factor in the transition to sustained growth, first in Britain and then in the rest of 
northwest Europe, was economic diversification, particularly the expansion of the 
manufacturing and service sectors. Structural change meant that the economies of 
Holland and Britain were, by the nineteenth century, less vulnerable to changes in the 
terms of trade or diminishing demand for particular exports.  
 
In both cases, structural change required institutional reforms. Insights from the 
new institutional economic history suggest that the crucial reforms were linked to 
creating the right balance between state capacity and ensuring sufficient constraints on 
arbitrary behavior by the executive. It was the creation of these institutions which 
allowed the profits from New World trade to be used productively to promote structural 
in the cases of Britain and Holland, in contrast to Spain and Portugal. We show that the 
share of the labour force in agriculture in Africa today has a high variance amongst 
economies at similar levels of per capita income. 
 
4.1 Structural change in Europe and Africa 
Table 3 gives the share of agriculture in the labour force of selected European countries 
since the medieval period. Rising per capita incomes were strongly associated with 
declining shares of labour in agriculture.  The growth of specialized industrial and service 
sectors can be seen to have proceeded faster in Holland and Britain than in the rest of 
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Europe in Table 3. By 1600, the release of labour from agriculture had proceeded further 
in the Netherlands than in the rest of Europe, as the Dutch economy relied increasingly 
on imports of basic agricultural products such as grain and paid for them with exports of 
higher value added products (de Vries and van der Woude, 1997). By 1700, the share of 
the labour force engaged in agriculture was even smaller in England, where a highly 
commercialized agriculture produced enough grain to feed the population without 
recourse to substantial imports until well into the nineteenth century (Deane and Cole, 
1967; Crafts, 1985). The share of the labour force in agriculture remained substantially 
higher in the rest of Europe.   
The high degree of specialization implicit in these numbers required individual 
producers to be confident that they could maintain access to reliable supplies of food 
through the market as they left the land, and to retain the profits from their investments 
and innovations in non-agricultural activities. This confidence came in part from 
institutional change, requiring a state with the capacity to enforce property rights, create a 
unified market and intervene during times of crisis. The formalised system of poor relief 
from the Elizabethan period, which encouraged English workers to remain in specialized 
non-agricultural occupations, had its origins in earlier developments at the local level, 
reaching back to the late-medieval period (Dyer, 2012) as well as the early Tudor period 
(Slack, 1988; Hindle, 2004, McIntosh, 2012). Solar (1995: 2-3) argues that from the 
seventeenth century the ‘uniformity and comprehensiveness’ of the English poor laws 
played an ‘integral, and to a degree autonomous, part in England’s economic 
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development’. Such state institutions also required strong parliamentary control to 
prevent arbitrary interference in business. 
 
 Data on the agricultural share of the labour force in African countries are shown 
in Table 4. As in Europe, there is a general negative relationship between the level of per 
capita income and the share of the labour force in agriculture, although it seems to be 
looser than in Europe. Thus the countries in the poorest category of income, Malawi and 
Tanzania, clearly have higher shares of labour in agriculture than the countries in the 
richest category, South Africa and Botswana. However, in the intermediate categories, 
the relationship is not monotonic. Thus, for example, Kenya has a lower agricultural 
share than Nigeria, despite being poorer.  
 
Zambia, with a share of 72.8 per cent in 2010, is the only country listed in this 
table where the agricultural share of the labour force actually increased from the 1960s to 
2010. The case of Zambia raises the complicating issue of mineral resources in African 
structural change. Zambia’s economic growth has since the late 1920s depended on its 
large reserves of copper (Du Plessis and Du Plessis 2006: 352).  The rising share of the 
labour force in agriculture reflects two major shifts in the Zambian economy since 
independence in 1964. The first is the relative decline in the copper mining industry. 
Production declined in terms of both volume and value between the 1960s and the 1990s 
(Ferguson 1999: 7). The second was changing policies towards food production and 
marketing under pressure from the IMF during the structural adjustment reforms of the 
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1980s. Over the course of the 1980s food production increased, and the rural share of the 
population increased briefly in the 1980s and 1990s (Loxley 1990; World Bank 2013).  
 
The influence of mineral exports can be also be seen in Nigeria. Figure 7 shows 
the share of the labour force since the 1960s in Nigeria and Kenya. The greater degree of 
structural change in Kenya can be explained by the dominance of oil exports in Nigeria. 
At independence, per capita incomes in both countries were similar, and in both countries 
agriculture’s share of the labour force was around 80%. This percentage dropped in both, 
to a low of 48% in Kenya and 58% in Nigeria in 2010, although Kenya’s GDP per capita 
did not increase as quickly. In this case, the contribution of oil to Nigerian GDP per 
capita means that it does not necessarily reflect the degree of structural change.  One 
implication of this finding is that looking beyond GDP per capita to measure the degree 
of structural change may be helpful in assessing the prospects for growth reversals in 
African countries. It will also be helpful in the next section to examine the institutional 
changes underpinning those structural changes. 
 
4.2 Institutions and growth reversals 
Drawing on the extensive literatures on both early modern Europe and twentieth-century 
Africa, this section will stress two aspects of institutional change, namely constraints on 
the executive and an increase in state capacity. Each has been emphasized in the literature 
on Europe, where debates have emerged about the relative importance of each factor. In 
Britain, the first country to achieve modern economic growth, the heart of the debate is 
the significance of the Glorious Revolution in 1688. On the one hand, by giving 
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legitimacy to the tax raising powers of Parliament, it permitted the growth of state 
capacity and a unified domestic market (Epstein, 2000 and O’Brien, 2011). The emphasis 
of these two authors is on the centralization of state power and the rise of the “fiscal 
state”. On the other hand, by confirming the supremacy of Parliament, the Glorious 
Revolution placed effective constraints on the executive powers of the Crown, a feature 
emphasized by North and Weingast (1989) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005). 
The Glorious Revolution was just one stage in a process of institutional development, and 
that its effects were not felt overnight (Stasavage, 2002). Although trust and the security 
of property rights can be destroyed overnight, building them up takes time.  
 
The extensive literature on African institutions has also stressed the need for both 
executive constraint and state capacity. Baskaran and Bigsten (2013: 92) argue that the 
challenge ‘that every society faces is to provide the state with the means to fulfill its 
legitimate duties, while at the same time preventing it from misusing these means to 
suppress dissent and expropriate private wealth’. Acemoglu and Robinson (2010: 23) 
similarly claim that ‘to generate sustained economic development requires not just the 
formation of centralized polities, but also the removal of the absolutist and patrimonial 
tendencies of such polities’, though they particularly emphasize the importance of the 
latter. The same debate has emerged in the study of colonial states. Crawford Young 
(1994) borrows a Congolese term, bula matari or crusher of rocks, to describe the 
colonial state and its legacy of absolutism. In contrast, Herbst (2000) argues that colonial 
states were subject to the same hindrances which limited state centralization during the 
pre-colonial period, namely low population density and a small fiscal base.  
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Quantitative measures of institutional quality have often proved elusive. This 
paper will rely on widely-accepted proxies for institutional performance in both Europe 
and Africa to assess the extent to which countries at different levels of income have 
undergone institutional change. The first, as a measure of state capacity, is fiscal revenue. 
Early modern Britain and Holland pulled away from Spain and Portugal in terms of both 
the ability of the state to raise taxes that allowed for an expansion of state capacity and 
the control exercized by mercantile interests over the state through parliament. Table 5 
gives revenue per capita in grams of silver for selected European countries from the 
sixteenth to the eighteenth century. It shows a pattern of divergence between northwest 
Europe and the rest of the continent, with England and the Dutch republic forging ahead.  
 
Table 6 gives the average of three major indicators of fiscal performance across 
African countries from each income group for which data on all three indicators are 
available.2 The first indicator is revenue as a share of GDP. Critics of this measure note 
that it does not distinguish between earned and unearned revenue. The second measure, 
the tax effort index, was designed in part to address this problem. The index measures a 
country’s tax collection performance relative to what it could be expected to collect given 
the current state of its economy, measured by per capita GDP, the ratio of trade to GDP 
and the share of agriculture in national income. Tax collections are expected to increase 
with GDP and foreign trade, and decrease as the share of agriculture increases (African 
Economic Outlook 2010: 94-5). The third indicator is revenue per capita in US dollars.  
                                                         
2 Excluded are Burundi, Niger, Togo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Zimbabwe.  
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In Table 6, there is a strongly positive relationship between the level of per capita 
income and fiscal revenue per capita, just as in the European case. However, the 
relationship is less clear-cut when fiscal performance is measured in terms of revenue as 
a share of GDP or tax effort. At the lowest income level, countries have an average tax 
effort below one, meaning revenue is below expectations. At higher levels of income, 
however, the picture is complicated by the mixture of ‘earned’ and ‘unearned’ income 
(Moore 2001: 389). Earned revenue has ‘historically played a major role in 
institutionalizing representative legislatures and, less directly, democracy and civil 
liberties’, while unearned revenue may relieve the state of the need to accommodate the 
demands of its citizens. Excluding oil producers in Table 6B has quite a dramatic effect 
on the tax effort of relatively rich countries without oil.  
 
Whether differences in the fiscal performance of African states are the result of 
current policies or historical institutional legacies remains the subject of debate. The 
importance of historical institutions in shaping the tax capacity of African states has been 
stressed by recent research on the legacies of colonial rule (Gardner 2012; Mkandawire 
2005; Olsson 2009). On the other hand, other work has stressed the greater importance of 
post-independence political imperatives (Block 2002; Kasara 2007). Looking at the fiscal 
performance over time of the four case study countries discussed in section 3 suggests 
that the relative positions of African countries are of long standing. Table 7 gives 
measures of revenue for the four case study countries outlined in section 3 since the early 
twentieth century. As expected, South Africa leads in terms of both revenue as a share of 
GDP since the 1990s. The success of tax reforms since 1995 has been one of the key 
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features of the move away from the apartheid regime (Ajam and Aron, 2007). However, 
Table 7 also shows that South Africa already raised considerably more revenue per capita 
in the first half of the twentieth century. Nigeria, on the other hand, underperforms 
relative to expectations both during the colonial period and since 1960, while Kenya does 
substantially better, even during the colonial period. Mkandawire (2010) argues that 
settler states developed more effective tax systems less dependent on trade taxes owing to 
the need for coercive strength. At the other end of the per capita income scale, Sierra 
Leone’s revenue collections dipped very low particularly during the civil war. In the 
earlier period, however, Sierra Leone raised considerably more revenue per capita than 
Nigeria, illustrating the ways in which conflict can undermine fiscal capacity.  
 
In European history, increasing revenue collections are often linked to 
concessions by the ruler of political voice and authority, as can be seen in a comparison 
of Tables 5 and 8, showing fiscal revenue per head and an index of parliamentary activity, 
respectively.   The index of parliamentary activity constructed by van Zanden, Buringhe 
and Bosker (2012) is based on the calendar years per century in which parliament met. 
During the first half of the second millennium, parliamentary activity was higher in Spain 
and Portugal than in the North Sea Area. However, activity then peaked in the fifteenth or 
sixteenth century in Spain and Portugal before going into decline. In the North Sea Area, 
by contrast, although parliamentary activity was slow to get going, it continued to 
increase after 1500, reaching very high levels during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, just as fiscal revenue in England and Holland also increased.  
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 For Africa, different measures of constraints on the executive must be used. Table 
9 presents polity scores for the four case study countries, taken from the Polity IV 
database (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2013). The polity index score is obtained as the 
democracy index score minus the autocracy index score, which can vary between -10 (no 
democracy and complete autocracy) to +10 (full democracy and no autocracy). Again, 
South Africa stands out as having an early high polity score. Kenya, Nigeria, and Sierra 
Leone on the other hand all exhibit substantial reversals. These parallel growth reversals 
and are similar to the retrenchments in parliamentary activity illustrated by 
Mediterranean countries in the early modern period.  
 
 The experience of the four case study countries can provide some insights into the 
links between institutions and growth reversals. All four, with the possible exception of 
South Africa since 1994, could be described under the North, Wallis, and Weingast 
(2009) framework as ‘limited access’ social orders. In limited access social orders, 
institutions are therefore vulnerable to crises linked to economic or political change 
which alter relations between members of the governing coalition. In all four countries, 
such crises have been linked to severe growth reversals which have limited overall gains 
in per capita income. This included the anti-apartheid protests in South Africa, the 
Biafran War in Nigera, Kenya’s post-elections crises and, most dramatically, Sierra 
Leone’s civil war. This instability makes specialization and therefore structural change a 
less certain proposition than in open access social orders where the institutions that 
protect property rights are open to all citizens.   
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
The rapid growth experienced by many African countries since the mid-1990s has 
prompted questions about how to distinguish temporary growth booms from sustained 
economic growth. One challenge in making such assessments has been that the literature 
on sustained growth is based on the experience of currently wealthy countries in the 
period after they made the transition to modern economic growth (Johnson, Ostry and 
Subramanian, 2010:125). One way to resolve this is to compare Africa with other parts of 
the developing world. Another is to look beyond 1850 to the economic performance of 
European countries well before they had made the transition to sustained economic 
growth. 
 
This paper adopts the latter strategy, and uses new data on per capita incomes in 
European countries dating back to the thirteenth century to examine the patterns of 
growth in pre-industrial economies over the long run. These data illustrate that levels of 
per capita income in pre-industrial Europe were not, as has long been assumed, near 
subsistence levels. This is also true of certain areas of sub-Saharan Africa for which data 
are available, notably the Cape Colony in Southern Africa. They also show that the 
pattern of economic growth experienced by African countries during the post-war period, 
characterized by growth accelerations followed by reversals, can persist over the very 
long run – in the European case, for half a millennium.  
 
Literature on Africa’s recent economic performance has focused on measuring the 
scale and duration of growth accelerations, attempting to identify thresholds which 
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distinguish sustained growth from temporary growth booms. The European experience 
suggests that the more important criteria are indicators of institutional quality and 
structural change. The European ‘Little Divergence’ occurred when the North Sea Area 
economies of Britain and Holland achieved institutional changes necessary to support 
increased specialization and structural change. Indicators of both structural change and 
institutional quality in Africa suggest that mineral producers with higher levels of per 
capita income and higher growth rates may in fact perform less well on these indicators 
than poorer countries with no mineral reserves.   
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FIGURE 1: Real GDP per capita in Italy and Spain 1270-1850 (1990 
international dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
Source: Malanima (2011); Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013). 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Real GDP per capita in Britain and Holland, 1270-1870 (1990 
international dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
Source: Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen (2011); van Leeuwen 
and van Zanden (2012). 
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FIGURE 3: Real GDP per capita in the Cape Colony and South Africa, 1701-1910 
(1990 international dollars) 
 
 
 
Source: Fourie and van Zanden (2013) 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4: Real GDP per capita, all African countries, 1950-2010 (1990 interna-
tional dollars) 
 
 
 
Source: Derived from Maddison (2010) 
01000
20003000
40005000
6000
1701 1711 1721 1731 1741 1751 1761 1771 1781 1791 1801 1811 1821 1831 1841 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001Cape Colony South Africa
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
34  
TABLE 1: GDP per capita levels in Europe (1990 international dollars) 
 
 England/ 
GB 
Holland/ 
NL 
Italy Spain 
1086 754 -- -- -- 
1270 759 -- -- 957 
1300 755 -- 1,482 957 
1348 777 876 1,376 1,030 
1400 1,090 1,245 1,601 885 
1450 1,055 1,432 1,668 889 
1500 1,114 1,483 1,403 889 
1570 1,143 1,783 1,337 990 
1600 1,123 2,372 1,244 944 
1650 1,100 2,171 1,271 820 
1700 1,630 2,403 1,350 880 
 1,563    
1750 1,710 2,440 1,403 910 
1800 2,080 2,617 1,244 962 
  1,752   
1820 2,133 1,953 1,376 1,087 
1850 2,997 2,397 1,350 1,144 
 
Sources and notes: England/Great Britain: Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van 
Leeuwen (2011); Broadberry and van Leeuwen (2011); Holland/Netherlands: van Zanden 
and van Leuwen (2012); Italy: Malanima (2011); Spain: Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la 
Escosura (2013). Figures are for 10-year averages starting in the stated year (i.e. 1270-79, 
1300-09,…) apart from 1348, which refers to the pre-Black Death years 1339-48, and 
1086, the year of the Domesday survey.  
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TABLE 2: 2008 GDP per capita Levels in Africa (1990 international dollars) 
 
< $750 $750 - $1,500 $1,500 - $2,000 > $2,000 
Burundi Benin Angola Botswana 
Central African 
Republic 
Burkina Faso Ghana Congo-Brazzaville 
Chad Cameroon Lesotho Equatorial Guinea 
Dem. Republic 
of the Congo 
Côte d’Ivoire Nigeria Gabon 
Guinea Djibouti Sudan Namibia 
Guinea Bissau Eritrea  South Africa 
Malawi Ethiopia  Swaziland 
Niger Gambia   
Sierra Leone Kenya   
Tanzania Liberia   
Togo Mali   
 Mauritania   
 Rwanda   
 Senegal   
 Somalia   
 Uganda   
 Zambia   
 Zimbabwe   
 
Source: Derived from Maddison (2010). 
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FIGURE 5: GDP per capita in South Africa and Nigeria, 1950-2008 (1990 
international dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
Source: Derived from Maddison (2010). 
 
 
FIGURE 6: GDP per capita in Kenya and Sierra Leone, 1950-2008 (1990 
international dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
Source: Derived from Maddison (2010). 
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TABLE 3: Share of agriculture in the European labour force (%) 
  
 England Netherlands Italy France Poland 
1300 -- -- 63.4 -- -- 
1400 57.2 -- 60.9 71.4 76.4 
1500 58.1 56.8 62.3 73.0 75.3 
1600 -- 48.7 60.4 67.8 67.4 
1700 38.9 41.6 58.8 63.2 63.2 
1750 36.8 42.1 58.9 61.1 59.3 
1800 31.7 40.7 57.8 59.2 56.2 
 
Source: Derived from Broadberry, Campbell and van Leeuwen (2013); Allen (2000: 8-9). 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Share of agriculture in the African labour force, countries grouped by 
per capita incomes in 2008 (%) 
 
 <$750  $750 - $1,500  
 Malawi Tanzania  Ethiopia Kenya Senegal Zambia 
1910        
1920        
1945        
1960-1965 84.4 91.7  96.2   63.2 
1970 86.7 91.4  92.5 81.0 73.3 62.8 
1980 87.0 87.4  89.3 78.0 70.2 68.0 
1990 86.1 86.1  89.4 71.2 65.8 75.3 
2000 82.3 83.5  84.9 56.1 58.3 71.6 
2010 65.2 73.4  75.2 48.3 57.4 72.8 
 
 
 <$1,500 - $2,000  > $2,000 
 Ghana Nigeria  Botswana South 
Africa 
1910     58.7 
1920     69.5 
1945     48.4 
1960-1965 60.7 78.1  87.4 48.8 
1970 57.0 65.6  82.8 34.7 
1980 56.5 64.2  59.9 26.0 
1990 53.5 71.7  40.3 21.5 
2000 53.6 75.0  38.3 18.7 
2010 41.6 58.9  38.6 15.0 
 
Sources: Africa Sector Database; Mitchell (2007). 
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FIGURE 7: Share of agriculture in the labour force (left axis) and GDP per capita 
(right axis), 1960-2010 
 
A. Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
B. Kenya 
 
 
 
Source: African Sector Database (de Vries, Timmer and de Vries, 2013). 
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TABLE 5: Per capita fiscal revenues in Europe, 1500/09 to 1780/89 (grams of silver) 
 
 1500/09 1550/59 1600/09 1650/59 1700/09 1750/59 1780/89 
Dutch Republic -- -- 76.2 114.0 210.6 189.4 228.2 
England 5.5 8.9 15.2 38.7 91.9 109.1 172.3 
France 7.2 10.9 18.1 56.5 43.5 48.7 77.6 
Spain 12.9 19.1 62.6 57.3 28.6 46.2 59.0 
Venice 27.5 29.6 37.5 42.5 46.3 36.2 42.3 
Austria -- -- -- 10.6 15.6 23.0 43.0 
Russia -- -- -- -- 6.3 14.9 26.7 
Prussia -- -- 2.4 9.0 24.6 53.2 35.0 
Ottoman Empire -- 5.6 5.8 7.4 8.0 9.1 7.1 
Poland 1.5 0.9 1.6 5.0 1.2 0.8 11.2 
 
Source: Karaman and Pamuk (2010: 611). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6: Fiscal performance in African countries (by per capita incomes in 2008 
 
A. Average across African countries 
Income level % of GDP Tax effort (2007) Per capita (US$) 
< $750 22.4 0.88 69.81 
$750-$1,500 21.9 1.21 126.22 
$1,500-$2,000 41 1.10 552.46 
< $2,000 37.3 1.09 1,971.29 
 
B. Averages excluding oil producers 
Income level % of GDP Tax effort (2007) Per capita (US$) 
< $750 21.7 0.97 45.77 
$750-$1,500 21.9 1.21 126.22 
$1,500-$2,000 49.6 2.06 220.75 
< $2,000 32.1 1.66 1,284.08 
 
Sources and notes: Calculated from African Economic Outlook (2010). Part B excludes 
countries  where resource revenue represents more than 50 per cent of total revenue. 
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TABLE 7: Fiscal revenues in Africa 
 
A. Colonial period (£ per head, current prices) 
 South Afri-
ca 
Nigeria Kenya Sierra Leo-
ne 
1911 2.88 0.15 0.30 0.33 
1921 4.71 0.26 0.64 0.41 
1931 4.03 0.25 1.00 0.50 
 
B. Since independence (% of GDP) 
 South Afri-
ca 
Nigeria Kenya Sierra Leo-
ne 
1990 -- -- 19.5 5.6 
1995 -- -- 21.6 9.4 
2000 26.3 -- 19.7 11.4 
2005 30.1 9.4 20.2 8.7 
2010 28.8 9.7 20.3 9.8 
 
Sources and notes: Colonial period: Total tax revenue in current £ divided by total popu-
lation, from Gardner (2012). Since independence: Cash receipts from taxes, social securi-
ty contributions and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent and income form property or 
sales, expressed as a share of GDP, from The World Bank: Data  
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.REV.XGRT.GD.ZS). Grants are also considered 
as revenue but are excluded here. 
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TABLE 8: Activity index of European parliaments, 12th to 18th centuries (calendar 
years per century in which parliament met) 
 
 12th  13th  14th  15th  16th  17th  18th  
North Sea Area        
England 0 6 78 67 59 73 100 
Scotland 0 0 10 61 96 59 93 
Netherlands 0 0 0 20 80 100 100 
        
Mediterranean        
Castile and Leon 2 30 59 52 66 48 7 
Catalonia 3 29 41 61 16 14 4 
Aragon 2 25 38 41 19 11 1 
Valencia 0 7 28 29 12 4 0 
Navarre 2 7 17 33 62 30 20 
Portugal 0 9 27 47 12 14 0 
 
Source: van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker (2012: online appendix S1). 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9: Polity index scores in Africa (range -10 to +10) 
 
 South Africa Nigeria Kenya Sierra Leone 
1910 4 -- -- -- 
1950 4 -- -- -- 
1960 4 8 -- 6 
1970 4 -7 -7 1 
1980 4 7 -6 -7 
1990 5 -5 -7 -7 
2000 9 4 -2 0 
2010 9 4 8 7 
 
Sources and notes: Polity IV database (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm). 
The polity index score is obtained as the democracy index score minus the autocracy in-
dex score. Details of the components of the indices are set out in Marshall, Gurr and Jag-
gers (2013).  
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